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TEAM COORDINATION IN UAV OPERATIONS
Harry K. Pedersen
Cognitive Engineering Research Institute
Mesa, Arizona
Nancy J. Cooke
Arizona State University East and
Cognitive Engineering Research Institute
Mesa, Arizona
The term “unmanned” in the context of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations is too often taken literally,
overlooking the humans controlling, monitoring, collaborating, and coordinating from the ground. Promoting and
improving the performance of the human component in the operation of UAVs is paramount and enhancing the
coordination of the humans in the system is one of many important human factors issues which must be overcome.
Research from the Cognitive Engineering on Team Tasks Laboratory has approached this problem with the
development of a synthetic test-bed replicating UAV coordination in the lab. Findings from this synthetic task
environment (STE) will be discussed in context of the implications that UAVs are in fact manned and require the
attention of the human factors community.
Introduction
The Department of Defense defines unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) as powered aerial vehicles that do
not carry human operators, use aerodynamic forces of
lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can
be expendable or recoverable, and can carry lethal or
non-lethal payloads (Blazakis, 2004). The role of
UAVs in the military has rapidly expanded over the
years such that every branch of the U.S. military
deploys some form of UAV in their intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. Recent
U. S. military successes include a USAF Predator
UAV operating in Iraq that successfully aided in
finding Saddam Hussein (Rogers, 2004). Perhaps the
most amazing fact from this is that the crew which
was actively in control of the UAV, was located in
Nellis AFB in Las Vegas, Nevada. Another more
recent example took place in August 2004 when a
Predator UAV armed with Hellfire missiles rescued a
group of U. S. Marines pinned down by sniper fire in
Najaf, Iraq. That Predator was also controlled from
Nellis AFB in Las Vegas, Nevada. The worth of
UAVs has become such that the militaries of every
major power on the planet employs the use of UAVs
including, but not limited to Germany, England,
China, France, Canada, South Africa, and Israel.
The use of UAVs has also become so popular that
many civilian uses have arisen, from security and law
enforcement uses such as border and wildfire
surveillance, to agricultural uses such as crop dusting
and crop health monitoring. For example, the NASA
ERAST Pathfinder has been successful in monitoring
coffee fields in Hawaii for ripe beans, which has
lowered operating costs and increased revenue for the

company (Roeder, 2003). UAVs have been so
successful, that future planned missions to Mars will
see the use of UAVs to explore the Martian surface.
Other uses for UAVs will eventually include
communication relay and weather monitoring by high
altitude-long endurance (HALE) platforms as well as
surveillance and reconnaissance in the service of
Homeland Defense.
UAV Mishaps
For all their successes and usefulness, the operational
record of UAVs has been marred by high mishap
rates which are frequently cited as a deterrent to the
widespread use of UAVs. Mishaps as defined by the
U. S. Navy, are unplanned events that directly
involve naval aircraft, which results in $10,000 or
greater cumulative damage to aircraft or personal
injury. Under this classification, a “Class A” mishap
is that in which the total amount of damage exceeds
$1,000,000 or results in the destruction of the aircraft.
The high mishap rate, which is currently 100 times
higher than that of manned aircraft, has proved to be
a deterrent to the military fully embracing the use of
UAVs. For example, the Pioneer UAV has an
unacceptable Class A mishap rate of 385 mishaps per
100,000 flight hours since 1986. In contrast, manned
Naval aviation has a rate of 2 mishaps per 100,000
flight hours (Jackson, 2003). The Predator UAV,
which has a total operational hour count of under
100,000 hours, has had 74 mishaps contrasted with a
mishap rate of 8.1 per 100,000 flight hours for
manned civil and commercial aircraft.
Schmidt & Parker (as cited in Fergusen, 1999),
examined 107 mishaps that occurred between 1986
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and 1993 and found that 59% were attributable to
electromechanical failure and 33% were due to
human errors attributed from crew selection and
training, pilot proficiency, personnel shortages,
operational tempo, and errors in teamwork and
aircraft control. Seagle (as cited in Fergusen, 1999)
also examined 203 mishaps from 1986 through 1997
and found that 43% of those were attributable to
human error. One example of a mishap occurred
when a Predator UAV encountered a fuel problem
during a descent and upon entering instrument
meteorological conditions, icing occurred and the
engine lost power.
The UAV crashed in an
unpopulated wooded area so there were no casualties.
It was determined that the operators’ attention
became too focused on flying the UAV in conditions
they had rarely encountered. Ultimately, there was a
lack of communication between the two operators
during the emergency, which resulted in the mishap.
The increasing frequency and varied applications in
which UAVs are being, and will be used, coupled
with the high mishap rate speak to the need for more
human factors research. There is much work to be
done in many areas including automation, vigilance,
feedback, procedures, crew selection, displays,
training, coordination, and communication. Given
today’s emphasis on teamwork and the foreseeable
future of UAV command and control possibly
emphasizing teams of teams of UAVs working in
concert in a heterogeneous network-centric
battlefield, we have identified the coordination and
command and control aspects of UAVs as a critical
research issue.
Myths and Fallacies
Despite the apparent usefulness and worth of UAVs,
and given their high mishap rate, very little human
factors work in this area has been done. We believe
that the lack of human factors work in the area is due
to several myths and fallacies that surround the
operation of UAVs. We feel that these false beliefs
hide the fact that there is much research that is
needed in this field. By shedding light on these
fallacies, we hope to draw attention to the current
human factors issues as well as any potential
problems that might arise in future systems.
The Automation Fallacy
UAVs are highly automated. Platforms such as the
Global Hawk are capable of taking off, flying
missions, and landing, all fully autonomously. The
belief is that more automation is better and if there is
a problem, a person can simply step in and deal with

it. However, over thirty years of sponsored research
has shown that automation changes the human’s task
and not always in a positive manner. Many mishaps
are attributed to the human being “out-of-the-loop,”
just as in manned aircraft such as commercial
jetliners. We posit that one of the advantages of
UAVs is that the humans have the ability to override
the automation and perform dynamic re-tasking.
The Air Traffic Control Fallacy
Another fallacy concerns the belief that since air
traffic controllers can monitor dozens of vehicles,
UAV operators should also be able to handle multiple
platforms at once. The fact here is UAV control
tasks involve much more that monitoring and control
of aircraft position. Many platforms such as the U. S.
Army Shadow and the U. S. Navy Pioneer are
controlled by stick and rudder controls. Dynamic retasking and re-planning maximally exploits the
system. In addition, many believe that the state of
the art is 1 operator per vehicle and that a 1:4
operator to vehicle ratio is a logical extension (Shope,
DeJoode, Cooke, & Pedersen, 2004). However, the
current state of practice demonstrates a 2:1 operator
to platform ratio and current research suggests that a
1:n operator to UAV ratio will prove to be
problematic.
The Manned Flight Fallacy
This fallacy stems from the belief that UAV flight is
no different from manned flight. Since the UAV is a
vehicle, piloting a UAV is similar to piloting an
airplane in the cockpit, thus a single pilot should be
sufficient. The truth is that a UAV is not simply a
vehicle, but a system that includes ground control,
operators,
intelligence,
weather
personnel,
maintenance personnel, and payload operators in
addition to the UAV itself. This “piloting analogy”
ignores years of studies on time lad, loss of visual
cues, depth perception, and ignores the system
functions that go beyond flight such as re-tasking, replanning, and sensor operation.
The Unmanned Fallacy
That UAVs are unmanned, and even the name
“unmanned,” has propagated the myth that UAVs are
indeed ‘unmanned.’ This notion could not be farther
from the truth however as there are always humans in
the loop at one point or another whether it is
preprogramming a UAV to takeoff, fly a set of
waypoints, and land autonomously, to the pilot that is
actually controlling the UAV via stick and rudder
controls. The fact that the UAV is uninhabited such
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that there is no actual flight crew onboard does not
mean that it is unmanned. The two examples
previously discussed above highlight the fact that
even though the crews in control of the UAVs were
roughly 7,000 miles away, there were nevertheless,
humans involved in the loop. This “unmanned
fallacy” assumes that since there are no humans in
the loop, there is therefore, no need for human
factors.
However, data gathered from the
examination of mishaps demonstrates that humans
are indeed a part of UAV control and that human
factors research should be an iterative part of the
design and implementation of UAV systems as well
the training of personnel and the development of
operational procedures.
Principles of Command and Control
Advances in technology have increased the cognitive
complexity of tasks and therefore, the need for
teamwork has also increased. Teams operating in
highly cognitive domains (e.g., aircraft cockpits, air
traffic control, operating rooms) are required to plan,
detect and interpret cues, make decisions, and
perform as one coordinated unit. We define teams as
a distinguishable set of two or more people who
interact
dynamically,
interdependently,
and
adaptively toward a common and valued goal, who
have each been assigned specific roles or functions to
perform, and who have a limited life span of
membership (Salas, Dickinson, Converse, &
Tannenbaum, 1992). The collaborative cognitive
processes that teams undergo are referred to as team
cognition. Team cognition is more than the sum of
the cognition of individual team members. Instead, it
emerges from the interplay of the individual
cognition of each team member and team process
behaviors.
Why measure team cognition? Team cognition
contributes to team performance now more than ever
in today’s cognitive tasks. Many organizations
(military and civilian) hold the belief that teams are
the solution to many problems. It is perceived that
teams are better able to handle stress, are more
adaptable in dynamic environments, make better
decisions, and are more productive than individuals
alone. Research on understanding team cognition
and effective team performance has long been an area
of intense focus for human factors, military, social,
cognitive, and industrial/organizational psychologists
(Cooke, Salas, Kiekel, & Bell, 2004).
Now, more than ever, issues of assessing team
performance, training teams, and designing
technological aids for effective team command-and-

control performance are critical, yet highly
challenging.
How can team performance be
measured? How can we characterize and assess
cognitive skill at the team level? Can assessment
occur without disruption of operational performance
and can it occur in time for intervention? How is
team cognition and performance impacted by
training, technology, and team composition? Is team
cognition different than the sum of the cognition of
individual team members?
What are effective
training regimes or decision tools for these team
members?
Our research program in the CERTT (Cognitive
Engineering Research on Team Tasks) Laboratory is
focused on these and other questions pertaining to
team performance and cognition. Team coordination
is characterized by timely and adaptive information
exchange among team members. More specifically,
command-and-control tasks in both military and
civilian domains can be characterized as challenging
from the perspective of the command-and-control
team for a number of reasons including the; 1)
unanticipated nature of the situation, 2) ad hoc
formation of team structure, 3) lack of familiarity
among team members, and 4) extended intervals with
little or no team training. Items 3 and 4 are
particularly relevant to military and civilian
command-and control communities because there can
be fairly long periods when command-and-control
teams are not able to train and practice together, yet
they are expected to be competent as soon as they are
deployed. We view team coordination as central to
team skill in command-and-control. In addition, for
teams that stay together in a natural, operational
setting (e.g., UAV teams) it is difficult to control the
amount of exposure teams get to the operational tasks
between laboratory sessions. Other goals of the
CERTT Laboratory include the identification of
issues and needs in the measurement of team
cognition, the development and evaluation of new
measures and the application of new measures and
methods in which to better understand and evaluate
team cognition.
The CERTT Laboratory
The heart of the CERTT Laboratory, shown in Figure
1, is a flexible synthetic task environment (STE) that
is designed to study many different synthetic tasks
for teams working on complex environments. STEs
provide an ideal environment for study of team
cognition in complex settings by providing a middleground between the highly artificial tasks commonly
found in laboratories and the often uncontrollable
conditions found in the field. We are currently
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studying team cognition with the use of an UAVSTE controlled by a three-person team whose
mission is to take reconnaissance photographs. This
current set-up is based on a cognitive task analysis of
the ground control station of the Predator UAV
operated by the U.S. Air Force (Gugerty, DeBoom,
Walker, & Burns, 1999). The UAV-STE emphasizes
many team aspects of tasks found in UAV operations
such as planning, re-planning, decision-making, and
coordination.

Figure 1. CERTT Lab participant and experimenter
consoles.
The team members involved in this task are the Air
Vehicle Operator (AVO) who flies the UAV by
controlling the heading, altitude, and airspeed, the
Payload Operator (PLO) who controls camera
settings and takes reconnaissance photos, and the
Data
Exploitation,
Mission
Planning
and
Communications Operator (DEMPC) who plans the
mission and acts as the navigator. More information
on the CERTT Laboratory can be found in other
publications (Cooke, Rivera, Shope, & Caukwell,
1999, Cooke & Shope, 2002).
Our Findings
Team Performance We use performance data as the
criterion against which other measures (i.e., team
process behaviors, taskwork knowledge, teamwork
knowledge, situation awareness) can be evaluated.
For instance, if one of our cognitive measures fails to
predict performance differences, then it is not as
useful as one that does. All interventions, personnel
selection
rules, manipulations, technological
innovations, decision aids, or training strategies are
of little importance if they have no impact on this
bottom line. As a result, much of the team literature
has focused on measures of team performance or
effectiveness and findings that impact team
performance or effectiveness (e.g., Salas et. al.,
1992). In our UAV-STE, we rely on a composite
measure of team performance that includes number
of targets photographed, number of airspace
violations, amount of consumables used (i.e. fuel,
film), and time spent in alarm or warning state.

Thus far, we have completed 5 separate experiments
which have examined team performance and
cognition under varying circumstances including the
co-location (all three members in the same room) vs.
distribution (members located in different rooms) of
team members, encouragement vs. discouragement of
information sharing during breaks, and the “forcefeeding” of teamwork and coordination information
prior to the development of taskwork knowledge.
Results from prior experiments indicate that the
encouragement vs. discouragement of information
sharing had no effect on team performance and that
attempts to “force-feed” teamwork and coordination
information were unsuccessful, suggesting a
sequential dependence of knowledge development
such that taskwork knowledge must precede
teamwork knowledge. Our findings have also shown
that geographic distribution of team members had no
effect on performance. Distribution did however,
have an effect on process behaviors and knowledge.
In addition to team performance, we measure process
behavior in our UAV task through experimenter
observations and ratings. Experimenters monitor
behaviors such as communication, coordination, and
leadership behaviors and rate them on a scale that
indicates the observed quality of these behaviors.
Also behavior is observed and rated at critical event
junctures in the simulation. Overall, we find that
process data can provide information where
performance data do not. In some cases we find that
outcome does not differ, but process does, providing
some insight into the teams’ adaptive behaviors. In
the experiment described above, we found that colocated and distributed teams behaved differently, but
managed to obtain similar performance scores
(Cooke, et. al., 2004). Without the process data we
might have assumed that there was no impact of
distributed or co-located settings, but in conjunction
with process data, we now understand that team
interactions were adaptive for their own environment
and the adaptation of the best teams may provide
insight for training or design interventions.
Overall, the lack of performance effects is good news
for military and civilian agencies which have begun
to embrace distributed command-and-control. This is
especially beneficial for the operation of teams-ofteams of UAV operators that must coordinate and
work in concert, yet are geographically distributed.
However, a caveat here is that teams need to be free
to adapt their coordination behavior to preserve
performance effectiveness. Thus, command-andcontrol environments and procedures demand careful
consideration of these human factors issues.
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Team Practice In our UAV task we have found
consistent and robust findings in regard to team skill
acquisition and in some cases, retention of that skill.
Individuals are trained to criterion on the AVO, PLO,
or DEMPC task prior to working together as a team.
Once they come together in a mission scenario as a
team, it takes them 3-4 40-minute missions to reach
asymptotic levels of team performance (Figure 2).
Our knowledge measures indicate that most taskwork
and teamwork knowledge is stable by the first
mission. The process and communications data, on
the other hand, indicate that teams during this initial
period of working together are learning how to
coordinate of pass information back and forth in a
timely and adaptive manner. There is also a hint of
loss due to a retention interval when some teams
returned after several weeks for their third session
(after Mission 7). The study of retention intervals on
coordination skills is currently being tested in the
laboratory.
600
Team Performance
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Communication patterns change as teams acquire
experience.
Why are we interested in
communication? It is not so much to train teams in
ways to better communicate, thereby enhancing
coordination, though that would be one approach.
Rather we view communication as a readily available
source of information on team cognition. Again,
because we view team cognition as an emergent
property of teams and believe that cognitive
processing at the team level takes place in the
interactions among team members, we see
communication as a direct reflection of team
cognition. Like team cognition, the communicationbased measures should predict team performance, but
should
also provide
additional
diagnostic
information.
After having identified patterns
associated with ineffective and effective teams, we
are now exploring finer distinctions among teams in
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awareness that can be ascertained through analysis of
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automate this process with the ultimate goal of
embedded and on-line communication analysis
leading to a diagnosis of a team’s cognitive state.
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Figure 2. Team performance of 11 teams over 10
missions. A long break occurred between Missions
7-8
Team Communication Team communication is
central in
command and
control
tasks.
Communication is also a critical mode by which
coordination occurs, though it is possible to
communicate in a variety of different ways (e.g., oral,
gestural, computer messaging) and it is possible to
coordinate implicitly without communication. In our
UAV
experiments
we
have
found
that
communication patterns (both the content of what is
said and the flow from person to person) are
associated with team performance (Kiekel, Cooke,
Foltz, & Shope, 2001).
Effective teams have different patterns compared to
ineffective teams. Effective teams are generally more
consistent in their communication patterns than
ineffective teams. Workload influences patterns.
Other subtle factors such as geographic distribution
also
influence
communication
patterns.

The success of UAVs in both military and civilian
applications is much more complex than is
commonly thought as demonstrated by the various
myths and fallacies that exist regarding their
operation. The complexity of operations is also
likely to become even higher as more UAVs take to
the skies, flying longer, more varied missions. While
this may not be as important an issue to military
forces operating in sparsely populated areas of the
world, this is of special concern in populated civilian
areas. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
has mandated that in order for UAVs to operate in the
national airspace (NAS), certain safety issues must be
addressed.
These issues include the need for
collision avoidance, and over-the-horizon subsystems
development, leading up to the establishment of
certification processes and operating criteria
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
2001). These concerns stem from the simple fact
UAV operation in the NAS is hazardous because
there is no pilot onboard that can aviate, navigate,
communicate, diagnose problems, and scan the
environment for traffic.
Despite the inevitable advances in collision
avoidance and over-the-horizon technologies,
chances of mishaps will still become higher due to
the increased traffic and coordination requirements
on teams of UAVs. Coupled with the aspect of UAV
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operators working in teams of teams, controlling
multiple platforms, and interacting with manned air
traffic and air traffic controllers, the need for
interventions stemming from the study of
performance,
training,
communication
and
coordination in UAV operations will become a
valuable commodity. In addition, our research has
shown that the coordination among only 3 ground
control personnel controlling a single UAV is highly
complex. Studies have yet to be conducted in the
coordination of all personnel (i.e. operators,
maintenance staff, air traffic control) involved in the
operation of a single system. In addition, future
military doctrine calls for an increase in the UAV to
operator ratio where it is thought that one operator
will control multiple UAVs. What will be the impact
on coordination? What will happen when single
operators controlling multiple UAVs must coordinate
and interact with other operators performing the same
task, air traffic control, and other manned aircraft?
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